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WHAT IS A "PLAN" UNDER INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE SECTION 105(D)?
I. INTRODUCTION
People generally dislike paying taxes, but we nevertheless recog-
nize that taxes are necessary. One authority observes that our tax laws
Creflect a continuing struggle among contending interests for the
privilege of paying the least."1 The most obvious struggle, of course,
is over the income tax. The Internal Revenue Service, however, strives
to maintain an equilibrium of employing countervailing policies: one
which strives for collection of the largest possible amount of money
with the least possible amount of administrative expense; others which
are designed to protect individuals from undue tax burdens. This latter
policy is manifested in part by allowing an exclusion from gross income
for "sick pay."
II. IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE SICK PAY EXCLUSION
Two idealogical concepts merit consideration in connection with
the "sick pay" exclusion. The first is the ability of the taxpayer to meet
tax burdens. The slogan, "ability to pay," suggests it is consistent with
federal income tax policy that tax burdens should be shared according to
the abilities of the taxpayers.2 This concept compels a measurement of
the potentialities of individuals which could never be measured pre-
cisely. Nevertheless, ability to pay has been measured by the net income
of the individual. This is undoubtedly the method and perhaps the
only practical method of measurement. From the point of view of the
federal government, there would seem to be small advantage in taxing
subsistence incomes because such would result in further impoverish-
ment of the impoverished which in turn would lead to increased de-
mands upon the federal government for welfare expenditures.' The
second ideological concept is the matter of equity; i.e., the idea that
taxpayers similarly situated should be similarly treated. This notion, of
course, implies that special relief should be given to certain taxpayers
who are differently situated from all other taxpayers.4
There can be little doubt that when the exclusion for "sick pay"
was conceived, legislators were distressed about undue financial bur-
dens carried by persons who were sick or physically disabled. That
1 L. Eisenstein, The Ideologies of Taxation 3, 4 (1961).
2 See generally Buehler, "Ability to Pay" 1 Tax L. Rev. 243 (1946).
3 Id. at 252.
4 Eisenstein, "Some Second Thoughts on Tax Ideologies" N.Y.U. 23rd Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 1, 3 (1965).
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persons absent from work due to illness have a decreased ability to pay
is most obvious in cases where the employee loses his pay and incurs
medical debts. No undue tax burden allocable to the period of illness
exists in this situation since ability to pay is measured by net income.
However, where a person receives "sick pay" during the course of his
absence from work, his apparent ability to pay, as measured by the
tax tables, is not substantially decreased. Yet he is left with his tax
burden plus his medical debts.' Without an exclusion for "sick pay,"
the person so misfortunate as to be absent from work because of illness
is placed in the same class with taxpayers who have no similar pre-
dicament. Thus, it seems that any criticisms or suggested revisions of
the "sick pay" exclusion legislation should be directed at taking the
greatest account possible of the ability to pay so as to treat, within
the limitations of practicality, each taxpayer equitably.
III. TiE 1939 CODE PROVISiON
The "sick pay" exclusion is of comparatively recent origin. The
policy of allowing exclusions from gross income for "sick pay" was
first effectuated in section 22(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939. That section provided that compensation for injuries or sick-
ness were excludable if received through accident or health insurance or
under workmen's compensation acts. 6 Although the words "accident or
health insurance" have a traditional meaning which is clear, they were
to become the focal point of the litigation involving that Code section.
The lack of specific definition in either the Code or the Regulations
generated much uncertainty.
The first case reaching beyond the traditional meaning of "health
and accident insurance" was Epmeier v. United States.7 In that case,
an insurance company employee had brought action to recover income
G There is, of course, some tax relief granted in the form of a deduction for medical
expenses under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213.
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (5) provides as follows:
(b) Exclusions from Gross Income.-The following shall not be included
in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter:
(5) Compensation for injuries or sickness.-Except in the case of amounts
attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 23(x)
in any prior taxable year, amounts received through accident or health insurance
or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or
sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement
on account of such injuries or sickness, and amounts received as a pension,
annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from
active service in the armed forces of any country.
7 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
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taxes paid on 1,800 dollars in sickness benefits. The plaintiff's employer
had in effect for its employees a self-insured life and health plan which
was available to all employees who were able to qualify by passing a
medical examination. The issue was whether or not the benefits paid
were amounts received through health insurance under section 22 (b) (5)
of the 1939 Code, and it was held that they were. The court took note
of the fact that the plan under which the payments were made was
somewhat different in form from the insurance contracts sold commer-
cially, although some characteristics of a formal insurance contract
were present.8 Commenting that it knew of no reason why insurances
must be expressed in a formal policy, the court held that the statutory
provision was intended to give relief to a taxpayer who had the misfor-
tunes of becoming ill or injured and of incurring extra financial burdens.
Allowing the exemption, the court added "[s]urely there is no legal
magic in form; the essence of the arrangement must determine its legal
character."9
That Epmeier represented an expansion of previous administrative
policy is clearly demonstrated by the Commissioner's refusal to accept
this decision."0 The process of expanding the definition of health and
accident insurance to effectuate more equitable treatment of taxpayers
thus reached a standstill requiring either an action of the Supreme Court
or a revision by the legislature; eventually both occurred.
The final word with respect to the definition of health and accident
insurance under the 1939 Code was handed down by the United States
Supreme Court in Haynes v. United States." In this case the plaintiff,
an employee of a telephone company, received payments of 2,100 dol-
lars under a company disability benefit plan during the year 1949. The
Internal Revenue Service collected 318 dollars income tax on those
benefits. Plaintiff brought an action for a refund claiming an exemption
under the statute. The district court found that the payments were not
taxable and ordered a refund. The court of appeals reversed holding
"that Southern Bell's plan was not 'health insurance' but a 'wage con-
tinuation plan'."'
The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion delivered by Mr.
Justice Black, defined health insurance broadly as "an undertaking by
one person for reasons satisfactory to him to indemnify another for
8 A medical examination is a common insurance contract requirement, as is the
distinction maintained between employees passing and failing their medical examinations.
9 Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952).
10 Rev. Rul. 208, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 102.
11 353 U.S. 81 (1957).
12 Id. at 83.
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losses caused by illness."'" The court, believing that the plan in question
was encompassed by that definition, observed that the plaintiff had
received the same kind of protection under the plan in question as he
would have received from a commercial insurance policy. The primary
significance of this decision is not in holding that health insurance
must be defined broadly but in its reaffirmance of the principle that
form must be relegated to a position secondary to substance. This case
also serves as a reminder of the possibility that the application of a
statute may become illogical if the underlying purpose of the legislation
is disregarded.
Long before the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Haynes,
Congress was already probing for revision, many congressmen having
realized the inequities of distinguishing between formal insurance plans
and individual self-insured plans. Employees who were receiving the
same benefits under two similar programs were being treated differently
by the statute.
IV. TnE 1954 CODE PROvIsIoN
Unfortunately the legislative history of section 105(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is quite sparse in its reference to the
definition of "wage continuation plans." The original bill H.R. 8300, as
first approved by the House of Representatives, did not contain a pro-
vision covering "wage continuation plans." Instead, that body, realizing
that controversy had been generated by Epmeier, intended by the new
bill to provide a rule of exclusion applicable to amounts received by the
employee under a plan as compensation for personal injuries or sick-
ness whether or not the plan was funded through insurance. 4 Subsection
(b) of the original section 105 limited exclusion to payments at a rate
not exceeding 100 dollars per week less the weekly rate of any non-
qualified compensation for the same period. 5 Nonqualified compensa-
tion was defined as payments which did not meet the criteria of subsec-
tion (c), which generally stated that a plan must be for the exclusive
benefit of employees and must be nondiscriminatory (i.e., of a type
which would qualify for exemption as a pension plan under section
501(e) of the 1954 Code.) 16 Thus, under a partnership form of enter-
prise, a plan which covered the partners as well as the employees would
not qualify.
Further requirements were that "[a]ll of the employees covered by
13 Id.
14 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A33 (1954).
15 Id.
16 Id.
[Vol. 28
COMM.ENTS
the plan must have an enforceable right to the compensation covered
under the plan during the period when the plan remains in effect, 117
and "a plan which provides for payment of compensation for loss of
wages during a period of sickness must provide a waiting period prior
to the time when benefits may be received under this section.""' Of
particular interest is the fact that the waiting period requirement applied
only to compensation for lost wages. Where compensation related to loss
due to medical or hospital expenses, the exclusion became applicable im-
mediately. Noting that the exemption of compensation for loss of wages
applies only to wages lost because of absence from work due to sickness
or personal injury, it is unclear why a distinction was made between
compensation for wages lost and compensation for loss due to medical or
hospital expenses.
The phrase "wage continuation plan" was perhaps first given
legislative recognition in a proposed amendment to H. R. 8300 sub-
mitted by Senator Morse of Oregon. 19 The announced purpose of this
proposal was to reduce restriction inherent in the qualified plan
criteria. 0 Commenting on the 100 dollars per week limitation, Senator
Morse concluded that this was a wise limitation in that it would keep
possible abuses by corporate executives to a minimum, but the Senator
heartily objected to the waiting period limitation."' Aware that most
health and accident plans include a waiting period, and without com-
menting on the merits of waiting periods, the Senator asserted that it
was not the function of Congress to legislate on the matter of how long
17 Id.
is Id. at A34.
19 100 Cong. Rec. 9322 (1954). The proposed language is as follows:
(d) Wage continuation plans: Gross income does not include amounts
referred to in subsection (a) if such amounts constitute wages or payments in
lieu of wages for a period during which the employee is absent from work on
account of personal injuries or sickness; but this subsection shall not apply to
the extent that such amounts exceed a weekly rate of $100. If such amounts are
not paid on the basis of a weekly pay period, the Secretary or his delegate shall
by regulations prescribe the method of determining the weekly rate at which
such amounts are paid.
20 Id. at 9322 to 9323.
21 Id. at 9323. Senator Morse stated:
A limitation of $100 per week has been placed on amounts excluded from
gross income when received as compensation for loss of wages under a so-called
disability plan. In my judgment this is a wise limitation, because it is my under-
standing that in the past corporation executives and other high-salaried em-
ployees have been able to draw the amounts of their regular salaries as tax-
exempt "disability" benefits from special plans while on extended vacations taken
on "doctor's orders."
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an employee must be off work in order to receive disability benefits.22
Furthermore, he thought that the waiting period limitation in the statute
would stimulate the use of a waiting period provision in health and
accident plans.23 Senator Morse's persuasive arguments against a wait-
ing period were apparently rejected in the Senate's version of the bill.
That version did, however, include a similar subsection (d). It provided
that amounts described in subsection (a) should not be included in gross
income 4f the amounts constituted wages or payments in lieu of wages
for a period which an employee was absent from work because of
personal injuries or sickness.2 4 There were two limitations upon the
exemption. The first limitation provided a ceiling of 100 dollars on the
exemption. The second provided a seven-day waiting period during
which payments were not exempt.25 The waiting period provided in the
Senate version was applicable whether payments were attributable to
lost wages or medical or hospital expenses. Thus, the House version's
illogical distinction between the two types of payments was removed.
Moreover, the Senate version specified a particular waiting period while
the House version left the length of the waiting period to the discretion
of the Commissioner.
The Joint Conference Committee substantially adopted the Senate
version of the bill. 6 Subsection (d) as it appeared in the conference
version provided that gross income did not include amounts specified
in subsection (a) if the amounts were for wages or payments in lieu of
wages for a period during which the worker was off work on account
of personal injuries or sickness2 7 The 100 dollars per week limitation
was also adopted. The seven-day waiting period was included and made
applicable when the absence from work was due to sickness. The most
noticeable change from the Senate version was that applicability of the
seven-day waiting period now depended upon whether the absence from
work was due to sickness or personal injury rather than whether the
payments were for wages lost or for medical or hospital expenses.
The statutory language in effect today is little changed from that
which was adopted in the conference version. Section 105 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides generally that amounts re-
ceived through accident or health insurance for losses due to sickness or
personal injuries shall be includible in gross income when the amounts
are attributable to contributions made by the employer which were not
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1954).
25 Id.
26 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1953).
27 Id.
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taxable as gross income of the employee.2 That section also deems in-
cludible direct payments by the employer to the employee for losses due
to sickness or personal injury.29 Section 105 (d) operates as an exception
to section 105 (a) and is essentially the same today as the joint con-
ference version, but the provisions of section 105(d) do not now apply
to amounts attributable to the first thirty days of the absence period if
the amounts exceed seventy-five percent of the employee's regular
wages.3 0 If the payments attributable to the first thirty days are not
more than seventy-five percent of the employee's wages, this section
will not apply to the extent that the amounts received exceed a rate of
75 dollars per week."' Furthermore, the seven-day waiting period does
not apply if the employee is hospitalized for at least one day during the
period regardless of whether hospitalization was due to personal injury
or sickness.32
V. FocAL POINT OF LITIGATION
Because of the legislative history of section 105 of the 1954 Code,
the statutory wording of that section, and the recent litigation involving
28 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 105(a) provides as follows:
Amounts Attributable to Employer Contributions.-Except as otherwise
provided in this section, amounts received by an employee through accident or
health insurance for personal injuries or sickness shall be included in gross
income to the extent such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the
employer which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or (2)
are paid by the employer.
29 Id.
30 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 105(d) provides as follows:
Wage Continuation Plans.-Gross income does not include amounts referred
to in subsection (a) if such amounts constitute wages or payments in lieu of
wages for a period during which the employee is absent from work on account
of personal injuries or sickness; but this subsection shall not apply to the extent
that such amounts exceed a weekly rate of $100. The preceding sentence shall
not apply to amounts attributable to the first 30 calendar days in such period,
if such amounts are at a rate which exceeds 75 percent of the regular weekly
rate of wages of the employee (as determined under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate). If amounts attributable to the first 30 calendar days
in such period are at a rate which does not exceed 75 percent of the regular
weekly rate of wages of the employee, the first sentence of this subsection (1)
shall not apply to the extent that such amounts exceed a weekly rate of $75,
and (2) shall not apply to amounts attributable to the first 7 calendar days in
such period unless the employee is hospitalized on account of personal injuries
or sickness for at least one day during such period. If such amounts are not paid
on the basis of a weekly pay period, the Secretary or his delegate shall by regula-
tions prescribe the method of determining the weekly rate at which such amounts
are paid.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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section 105(d), it appears that the definition of "wage continuation
plan" will be the focal point of litigation in years to come. While it is
true that no statutory definition of "wage continuation plan" was pro-
vided, the Regulations draw some rather general guidelines which ap-
proach a definition. Treasury Regulation section 1.105-4(2) (i) (1964)
states that a "wage continuation plan" means an accident or health
plan as defined in Treasury Regulation section 1.105-5. The latter
section defines an accident or health plan as an arrangement for pay-
ment to employees in case of sickness or personal injury.33 A plan may
cover only one employee or it may cover more, and plans may be dif-
ferent for different employees or for different classes of employees.3 4
Thus, the language seems to eliminate any requirement for nondiscrimi-
nation, a matter which the House of Representatives was so concerned
with when the bill was first drafted. A plan may be funded or not and
insured or not; it neither need be in writing nor enforceable by the
employee. If, however, the employee cannot enforce his rights, an ar-
rangement will constitute a plan only if the employee was covered at
the time of sickness or injury and the employee had either been given
notice of the arrangement prior to the time of sickness or such knowl-
edge was reasonably available to him. 6
The rulings of the Commissioner have been only somewhat helpful
in elucidating the general guidelines set forth in the Regulations. In a
1960 ruling, a bonus plan which was silent as to any relationship be-
tween it and absence from work on account of sickness or injury was
held not to be a "wage continuation plan" within the meaning of section
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5 (a) (1964) states in part as follows:
In general, an accident or health plan is an arrangement for the payment of
amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries or sickness. A plan may
cover one or more employees, and there may be different plans for different
employees or classes of employees. An accident or health plan may be either
insured or noninsured, and it is not necessary that the plan be in writing or that
the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable. However, if the
employee's rights are not enforceable, an amount will be deemed to be received
under a plan only if, on the date the employee became sick or injured, the em-
ployee was covered by a plan (or a program, policy, or custom having the effect
of a plan) providing for the payment of amounts to the employee in the event
of personal injuries or sickness, and notice or knowledge of such plan was
reasonably available to the employee. It is immaterial who makes payment of
the benefits provided by the plan. For example, payment may be made by the
employer, a welfare fund, a State sickness or disability benefits fund, an associa-
tion of employers or employees, or by an insurance company.
4 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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105(d) " With respect to the matter of definition, it was stated that:
"Implicit in these provisions is the requirement that there exist some
positive correlation, or causal connection, between the absence due to
injury or sickness and the payment made to the employee. Such pay-
ment must be on account of such absence."3 8 In an earlier ruling the
Service held that the term "wage continuation plan" included plans
which grant continued benefits to the employee until either he is able
to return to work or reaches retirement age.39 This ruling further held
that the exclusion from gross income is not destroyed by the fact that
the disabled employee engages in some part-time work for himself or
for another employer apart from his regular employment during the
period of disability. 0 One additional ruling has substantiated the fact
that the absence of a formal plan is not always fatal to a claimed exemp-
tion.41 In that case the worker was employed by the state legislature. Al-
though legislative employees were not covered by the state employee
plan, disability benefits were granted to legislative employees as a mat-
ter of custom and tradition s.4
Jackson v. United States,43 one of the first instances where the
"twage continuation plan" issue was litigated, indicated a leaning by the
court toward a liberal construction of the term. In that case, the plain-
tiff's decedent was a founder, executive vice president, and director of
a certain financial institution. Unable to work after the latter part of
1953 due to illness, plaintiff's decedent resigned as a director in 1954
but remained executive vice president until his death. Ineligible for the
institution's regular pension plan because of his age, plaintiff's decedent
and the president of the institution agreed that the decedent would re-
ceive 4,800 dollars per year for the period of his absence from work.
Use of the word "pension" was not fatal to a claimed exemption under
section 105 (d). The district court was of the opinion that congressional
enactments intended to relieve the tax burdens of sick or injured em-
ployees should be liberally construed. 4
Factually similar to Jackson, and perhaps the most cited case con-
cerning "wage continuation plans" is Estate of Kaufman.45 There
plaintiff's decedent organized a loan association and acted as its manag-
37 Rev. Rul. 60-203, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 41.
38 Id.
39 Rev. Rul. 57-178, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 71.
40 Id.
41 Rev. Rul. 59-265, 1959-2 Cure. Bull. 42.
42 Id. at 43.
43 3 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 517, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9171 (D. Wisc. 1958).
44 Id.
46 35 T.C. 663 (1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962).
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ing officer until mid-1953. In June of 1953, the decedent suffered a
stroke and was able to return to his office only once between June and
the time of his death in 1958. The decedent continued to hold the offices
of executive vice president and treasurer of the association, to which he
was elected after his stroke, until his death. The decedent continued to
receive his full salary until his death and he was visited occasionally by
members of the association to discuss affairs of the association. In only
one other instance had the association retained a disabled employee on
the payroll. In 1955 the loan association began a retirement pay plan
for all its employees. The decedent claimed a 5,200 dollars sick pay ex-
clusion in his 1955 tax return which was disallowed. The Commissioner
claimed that the plaintiff failed to prove that payments were received
according to the terms of a health or accident plan. The court consid-
ered that the legislative use of the word "plan" required something
more than "merely one or more ad hoc benefit payments."46 The court,
further observing that the decedent was consulted after his stroke and
continued as a member of the board of directors, concluded that the
payments were compensation for the decedent's services.
The court in Kaufman did not attempt to evaluate the reasonable
value of decedent's services after the stroke, but it would seem that the
stroke would decrease the amount and value of service which decedent
could perform. This possibility suggests that the amount of the dece-
dent's receipts over and above the reasonable value of his services did
in fact constitute a compensation for loss of wages or payment in lieu
of wages due to absences from work caused by sickness or personal in-
jury. Stated differently, it seems that a partial exemption should be
allowed in case of a partial disability rather than "all or none." Perhaps
this possible weakness could be corrected by amending section 105 (d)
to provide for a partial exemption. If the Service would permit partial
exclusion for partial disability, the plan could provide the mechanism
without further burden upon the Service. The employee could designate
the percentage of the payment which represents compensation and the
percentage which represents "sick pay." Furthermore, it seems that the
court's distinction between compensation for services performed and
compensation for loss of wages or payments in lieu of wages due to
absence from work is highly artificial. Actually, all transfers by an
employer to an employee whatever the form of payment are compensa-
tion for service performed.
However, the Kaufman case was decided properly but not because
of a distinction between compensation for service performed and pay-
ments for lost wages.
46 Id. at 666.
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Speaking of the word "plan" in the nonlegal sense, there was cer-
tainly a design to continue payments to Kaufman after his stroke, and
this design amounted to a great deal more than a series of ad hoc pay-
ments, if that phrase signifies that the question of payment or nonpay-
ment was reconsidered each time a payment was made. It is doubtful,
however, that the board of directors ever contemplated payments to
Kaufman before the date of stroke since it had only been done once in
the past. In addition, Kaufman had no knowledge of a "plan" nor was
knowledge of such a plan reasonably available to him. Without one of
these two requirements, the policy of allowing tax exemption in cases
of "wage continuation plans" would be subject to endless abuse; and
because the plaintiffs in Kaufman did not meet either of these require-
ments, the exemption was properly denied.
Shortly after the Kaufman decision, an Ohio district court in
Andress v. United States47 reached a result which may on the surface
appear conflicting. in that case plaintiff's decedent was employed as the
president of a department store corporation. Before 1945, he received
both a salary and a share of the profits, for he shared authority in the
policy-making of the corporation. After 1945, the decedent was returned
to a straight salary since he no longer shared in the policy-making. A
few years later the decedent was named to an honorary office, and it
was agreed that he should receive 15,000 dollars per year for the re-
mainder of his life whether or not he worked and whether or not he was
able to work. The decedent continued to receive the agreed salary until
his death although he was unable to work part of the time between the
agreement and his death. Plaintiff claimed that the decedent was en-
titled to an exemption under section 105 (d) because he was paid under
a prior agreement which was a wage continuation plan, 100 dollars per
week was excludible. The defendant, relying on Kaufman, claimed that
the salary payments were ad hoc payments insufficient to constitute a
plan. The court allowed the exemption reaffirming the fact that a plan
need apply to only one employee and the liberality of the courts in con-
struing congressional enactments intended to relieve the tax burden of
sick or injured employees.4"
In both Kaufman and Andress the taxpayers continued to receive
their salaries during periods of absence from work due to sickness or
personal injury. But there are two major differences in the factual
situations which justify the respective courts in reaching opposite con-
clusions. First, in the Kaufman case, the taxpayer was able to render
at least some useful services to his employer during the period of his
47 198 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
48 Id. at 376.
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illness. On the other hand, in Andress, the taxpayer was totally disabled
and therefore incapable of performing any useful service for his em-
ployer after the onset of his illness. Therefore, there could be no claim
that the payments to Andress constituted compensation for services
performed. Secondly, in Kaufman, the taxpayer had made no arrange-
ment with his employer prior to the illness regarding compensation in
case of disability. In fact the board of directors decided to continue
Kaufman's salary after he had suffered the stroke, and the "plan"
under which decedent's heirs had claimed an exemption did not come
into existence until nearly two years after the occurrence of the stroke.
In contrast, Andress had reached an agreement with his employers
prior to the beginning of his illness which provided for continuation of
salary for life regardless of whether the decedent worked or not and
regardless of whether the decedent was able to work or not. Therefore,
to apply the general criteria of Treasury Regulation Section 1.105-5,
which specifies that the employee's rights must be enforceable or knowl-
edge of the "plan" must have been reasonably available to the employee
at the time of the illness or injury, the factual situation in Andress
apparently qualifies under both these prerequisites. The agreement
between Andress and his employers may well have been enforceable
had the employers stopped the payments, and it is certain that Andress
had knowledge of the existence of a plan prior to the beginning of
his period of illness.
More recently, two additional cases have been decided in which
the result turned upon whether or not the taxpayer had enforceable
rights or had knowledge of the plan at the time of the illness or in-
jury. In Lang,49 the taxpayer's employer had in effect a general policy
whereby salaried employees received payments during periods of ab-
sence due to illness or injury and hourly employees did not. In no case
were there any enforceable rights and the final decision with respect to
any particular employee always rested with the managing office. The
plaintiff-taxpayer in this case was a sales manager on salary and be-
came unable to work because of heart attack. The managing officers
had decided not to continue his compensation payments, but he suc-
cessfully prevailed upon them to reconsider. The court concluded that
there was no plan under section 105(d) because plaintiff had no en-
forceable right to continued compensation, nor was knowledge of the
plan reasonably available to him. The court recognized the right of
the employer to treat various classes of employees differently but
stated that the rules must be determinable before the employee's sick-
ness arises."
49 41 T.C. 352 (1963).
50 Id. at 355-56.
[Vol. 28
COMMENTS
In Estate of Chism v. Commissioner5' the Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit reached the same result as the Tax Court did in Lang.
The plaintiff-taxpayer and his family held all the shares of an ice
cream business. Plaintiff, who acted as president of the company, was
disabled from work due to an illness. Relying on section 105(d), he
claimed an exemption, which was denied by the Commissioner. The
court of appeals, in affirming the action of the Commissioner, noted
that the "plan" under which plaintiff had claimed exemption had never
been reduced to writing, the employees were never formally notified of
the existence of a "plan," and the rights of the employees were sub-
ject to change without their consent. 52 Perhaps worthy of mention is
the ninth circuit's apparent requirement of a formal notification where
the rights of the employees are not enforceable. This requirement is
somewhat more stringent than the notice specified in Treasury Regu-
lation section 1.105-5, which merely requires that knowledge of the
"plan" be reasonably available to the employee. An informal notice
will suffice. The difference, however, may only be that between a printed
circular and oral notice by a personnel employee.
With respect to the purpose of payments to a disabled employee,
the Kaufman court concluded that since the taxpayer's services in an
advisory capacity were useful to the employer-association, payments
were compensation for services performed rather than compensation
for lost wages. However, one recent case disregarded occasional serv-
ices by an employee to hold that a "wage continuation plan" did exist.53
In that case plaintiff, who was a vice president and member of the
board of directors, was unable to work because of a nerve disease. The
court found that although plaintiff returned to the office occasionally,
he did not do any useful work. The court failed to discuss plaintiff's
value in an advisory capacity. Perhaps there is some ground for argu-
ment that at least some portion of plaintiff's payments were for services
performed.
Though much of the general criteria for a "wage continuation
plan" is not clear, one factual characteristic is fairly clear though its
determination may be difficult. Where payments are made to a tax-
payer who is past the retirement age, section 105 (d) is totally inap-
plicable.54 In determining whether a given employee is beyond the
retirement age or not, the employing company's policy must be con-
sidered. 5 This consideration may require a large volume of statistical
51 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963).
52 Id. at 961.
53 Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (ElD. Mo. 1965).
54 Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4(a) (3) (1) (a) (1966).
55 Commissioner v. Winter, 303 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1962).
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evidence and analysis which is both costly to the plaintiff and time-
consuming for the courts. Perhaps the Commissioner should specify
some age limit, such as sixty-five, as a guide for application of section
105(d). Admittedly an inflexible age limit might operate arbitrarily
in some cases, but since age sixty-five is the usual retirement age and
since persons over sixty-five are given other tax advantages such as an
extra personal deduction,56 possible injustices would seem to be mini-
mal. The advantages which would obtain from such a regulation would
be a decrease in litigation; where litigation is necessary, there would
be a saving of time and expense in presentation of evidence. The ad-
vantage of such a regulation would seem to overshadow the disad-
vantages of an arbitrary age limit.
In some litigation regarding the retirement issue, the courts have
accepted written plans as complying with the requisites of section
105(d) without discussion.57 It may be useful to examine the charac-
teristics of those plans.
The "wage continuation plan" which was accepted without ques-
tion in Corkum v. United States provided for two retirement plans;
one was for disability and the other for old age. The first plan was
applicable when an employee became totally and permanently incapaci-
tated before attaining a certain age, provided he had completed a cer-
tain term of service with the company.5" Since this plan was applied
56 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 151(c).
57 Bigley v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 757 (El). Mo. 1966); Corkum v. United
States, 204 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1962).
58 The "plan" in Corkum v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1962), is
recited as follows:
Conditions for Allowance. Any member in service classified in either Group A or
Group B who becomes totally and permanently incapacitated for further duty
before attaining age fifty-five and after completing fifteen or more years of
creditable service, or any such member who is a veteran as defined in section
one who becomes totally and permanently incapacitated for and after completing
ten or more years of creditable service, upon his written application on a pre-
scribed form filed with the board or upon such an application by head of his
department after a hearing, if requested, as provided for in subdivision (1) of
section sixteen and subject to the conditions set forth in said section and in this
section, shall be retired for ordinary disability as of a date which shall be
specified in such application and which shall be not less than fifteen days nor
more than four months after the filing of such application but in no event later
than the maximum age for his group, nor earlier than the last day for which he
received regular compensation. No such retirement shall be allowed unless the
board, after such proof as it may require, including in any event an examination
by the medical panel provided for in subdivision (3) of this section and including
a certification of such incapacity by a majority of the physicians on such medical
panel, shall find that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for
further duty, that such incapacity is likely to be permanent, and that he should
be so retired. Id. at 472 n.1.
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according to the judgment of a specially appointed board, enforcement
of rights by an employee would be difficult although perhaps techni-
cally possible. The plan apparently did not provide payments for per-
sons temporarily incapacited. From this case it might be concluded
that section 105(d) is applicable even when there is no possibility
that the employee could ever return to work, subject to the condition
that the employee is below the retirement age. In Bigley v. United
States, 9 a similar plan was considered without question as complying
with the requisites of section 105 (d). That plan provided a disability
pension for employees disabled because of sickness or injury if those
employees could ordinarily qualify for a service pension. The pension
was to be continued as long as that particular employee was unable
to return to the service of the company. 0 Returning employees were
able to retain seniority as the period of disability was treated as a leave
of absence." This case may indicate that the employer's criteria for
applicability of a "plan" may be similar to its retirement pension ar-
59 252 F. Supp. 757 (E-D. Mo. 1966).
60 Id. at 472. The plan was set out as follows:
Section 4. Pensions
1) a) All male employees who have reached the age of sixty years and
whose term of employment has been twenty or more years and all female
employees who have reached the age of fifty-five years and whose term of
employment has been twenty or more years shall if they so request, or may at
the discretion of the Committee, be retired from active service and, upon such
retirement, shall be granted service pensions.
b) Any employee whose term of employment has been thirty years or
more, or any male employee who has reached the age of fifty-five and whose
term of employment has been twenty-five or more years, or any female employee
who has reached the age of fifty years and whose term of employment has been
twenty-five or more years may, if the case is approved by the Committee as
appropriate for such treatment, be retired from active service and, upon such
retirement, shall be granted a service pension.
c) Any employee who has become totally disabled as a result of sickness
or of injury,... and whose term of employment has been fifteen years or more,
shall upon retirement by reason of such disability be granted a pension, which
pension is designated a "disability pension"; provided, that if, at the time of
such retirement, the employee is qualified for a service pension under subpara-
graph (a) or (b) above, a service pension shall be granted instead of a disability
pension. A disability pension shall continue so long as the employee is prevented
by such disability from resuming active service with the Company. If the
employee recovers sufficiently to resume active service, the disability pension
shall be discontinued and if the employee reenters the service of the Company
at that time, the period of absence or disability pension shall be considered as a
leave of absence and not as a break in the continuity of the employee's service.
In Keefe v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 589 (N.D.N.Y. 1965), the same plan was accepted
by the court without question.
01 Id.
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rangement and contained in the same document. The above-mentioned
examples are not extremely helpful in that the courts did not discuss
their respective applications of the general criteria for a "plan."
VI. PROPOSALS
It is evident from the few cases which have turned upon the "wage
continuation plan" issue that the definition of that term is far from
clear. Courts deciding this issue have been and will continue to be
concerned with what was the intent of Congress, but there must also
be some regard for how the taxpayer can be given the fairest treatment.
It is possible that Congress did not intend for the term "wage continu-
ation plan" to be a test independent of the usual insurance criteria. 2
If this criteria is what Congress intended, the only difference between
a ((wage continuation plan" and an "insurance plan" would be whether
the employer purchased insurance from an insurance company or fi-
nanced an arrangement of his own. An adoption of this view would
interject more predictability into the Code. However, it is more likely
that Congress intended that the term "plan" should be an independent
test of qualification.
Consistency with the probability that Congress intended to con-
struct an independent test demands a discarding of the traditional cri-
teria for insurance. There remains an entire gamut of possible com-
binations of criteria. At one extreme a "plan" could be defined as
merely an informal understanding between the employer and his em-
ployees that the employer will take care of his employees in case of
accident or illness. At the other extreme a "plan" could require specific
coverage and benefits formally communicated to the employees cov-
ered. One commentator apparently believed that Congress had in-
tended the more liberal criteria to apply, for he speculated that quali-
fying under the criteria for a plan should present little difficulty. 3
But cases decided since that speculation have indicated that qualifica-
tion is not so easy. While it is true that a liberal criteria for "wage
continuation plan" would provide employers with much more free-
dom, it would also seem true that there would be much greater oppor-
tunities for abuse. For example, an employer might attempt to adopt
a plan which would inadequately protect the employees but confer
extensive benefits on himself merely to obtain the advantages of sec-
tion 106, which provides an exemption for employer contributions to
62 Comment, "Taxation of Employee Accident and Health Plans Before and Under
the 1954 Code" 64 Yale L.J. 222, 230 (1954).
63 Gornick, "The 1954 Internal Revenue Code: Sick Pay, Meals, Lodging, Salesmen's
Expenses" 41 A.B.A.J. 612, 614-15 (1955).
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plans. Thus, it seems that there is some need for protecting the em-
ployee in this respect. 4
A more stringent criteria for qualification as a "plan" would re-
strict policy making of the employer. But the stringent approach seems
to have several advantages. First, it would operate to protect the em-
ployees by influencing the employers to adopt maximum coverage plans.
Secondly, it would have the effect of reducing litigation in this area
by making the law a great deal more predictable.
Another ambiguous requirement of section 105(d) is that the
"plan" must be a plan for employees. It has been generally conceded
without argument that corporate executives are employees within the
meaning of section 105(d). But one writer has expressed doubt that
partners would be considered employees." Perhaps it should be added
that it is doubtful that individual proprietors would be considered
employees within the meaning of section 105(d). The question is
whether partners and individual proprietors should be treated differ-
ently from managing officers of a corporation. The answer must be yes.
Though a corporate officer may control the plan under which he bene-
fits, he is not directly chargeable with the cost. Allowing tax relief to
either partners or individual proprietors would, in effect, result in a
double exemption because those parties are entitled to exclude the
cost of such "wage continuation plan." Another question arises with
regard to the same ambiguity. Does this requirement that a "plan"
must be for employees indicate that the "plan" must cover only em-
ployees or would a plan covering both partners and employees qualify
as to exclusions claimed by employees? Neither reported cases nor
the regulations answer this question, but it would seem that the fact
that a "plan" covers nonemployees as well as employees should not
operate to deny the exclusion for the employees because the "sick"
employee needs tax relief regardless of which type plan covers him.
As was previously mentioned, there is no authority in either the
Code, Regulations, or decisions which require that a plan be non-
discriminatory with respect to individuals covered. While there may
be justifiable reasons for treating various classes of employees dif-
ferently, there would seem to be no just reason for treating members
of the same class differently. A provision in the original House version
of the Code included guarantees against discrimination, but that pro-
64 An employer could devise a plan which allowed himself generous benefits while
allowing small benefits to his employees. Perhaps protection for the employees could be
accomplished by establishment of criteria for a qualified plan similar to that used for
pension plans and profit sharing plans. See generally Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401.
65 Pyle, "Accident and Sickness Insurance under Code Sections 104, 105, 106 and
213" 34 Taxes 363, 371 (1956).
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vision was deleted by the Senate.66 It is therefore doubtful that a dis-
criminatory plan would for that reason fail to qualify under the cri-
teria for a "wage continuation plan." A tax benefit statute which stands
idly in the face of discrimination promotes it in effect. Perhaps there
is need for an amendment to section 105 (d) and section 106 requiring
that a "plan" must cover all members of the classes of employees cov-
ered and that it must provide equal benefits for those members.
It has also been suggested that a "plan" should be enforceable by
the employee in order to qualify for exemption purposes because if
there is no obligation, there can be no plan. But there may be justifi-
able motives for the employer desiring to avoid enforceable obligations,
and requiring enforceability may discourage employers from adopting
plans. For example, the employer may wish to preserve for himself an
escape valve in case of a decline in the economy or a business reversal.
If the employer refused to pay or discontinued payments, the policy
or custom would be destroyed thereby disqualifying the arrangement
as a "plan." While it is true that the fastest and safest way to establish
a qualifying "plan" is to create an enforceable written obligation, there
seems to be no good reason to impose this formal requirement so long
as in substance the same effect is obtained through application of an
unenforceable arrangement.
The arrangement whether enforceable or not should be published,
however, and made available to the employees so covered. As the law
now stands, there is no requirement for a publication. It seems that
such a requirement would not unduly burden employers, and it would
operate to further protect the federal government against possible
abuses. But it would be unreasonable to require a writing where only
handful of employees were involved. An amendment is recommended
requiring a publication of "plans" covering four or more employees.
The notice requirement would remain the same for "plans" covering
less than four employees.
Finally, there remains the matter of whether the above-mentioned
goal can be best accomplished by specific statutory language or by
general statutory language leaving the particulars to the judiciary.
While it may be true that specific legislation occasionally results in
inequity, it seems to be the best solution especially from the stand-
point of ease of administration.68 A statute should be highly articulate
so as to set forth in detail the deductions and exemptions which will
66 Id.
67 Id. at 372.
68 Specificity in tax legislation is apparently the trend. See Paul, "Directions in
Which Tax Policy and Law Have Been Moving," 30 Taxes 949 (1952).
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be allowed. There exists, however, a danger of overcomplication which
could result in relaxed administration due to personnel limitations of
the Internal Revenue Service. Specific statutory language would hope-
fully reduce the volume of litigation while general statutory language
would probably lead to increased litigation. Furthermore, specific lan-
guage would tend to minimize differences among the circuits in judi-
cial administration and general language would probably increase such
differences.
In the final analysis, it seems that all income tax provisions, in-
cluding section 105(d), go through evolutionary stages of develop-
ment with each stage closer approaching the ultimate goal of tax legis-
lation, to collect the greatest amount of tax with the least effort and
at the same time treat each taxpayer equitably. The first step in this
process is to enact a general revenue measure. Secondly, Congress
realizes a need to grant relief to some class of taxpayers and deliber-
ately opens a loophole. Thirdly, Congress may discover that its delib-
erately created loophole has become such for too many others not
deserving tax relief. The attempt is then to contract the loopholes so
as to eliminate the relief for the undeserving taxpayer. It is belabor-
ing the obvious to state that no tax system can be completely per-
fected. The most we can hope for is that our tax structure will continue
apace toward that invisible, unattainable, and subjective goal denoted
"equity."
VII. CONCLUSION
The present law does not establish any specific requirements which
a plan must meet in order for payments to be excludable from the em-
ployee's gross income. A plan can be funded or nonfunded and can
be insured or noninsured. A plan can be in the form of an enforceable
written agreement or merely a company policy; but if the plan is of the
latter type, the employee must have been notified formally or in-
formally of its existence prior to receipt of benefits. The exclusion is
applicable only to payments attributable to a period of absence from
work due to a personal injury or sickness. The use of the word "plan"
implies something more than ad hoc benefits.
Philip K. Hargesheimer
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